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Mark W. Janis* 
Neutrality, at least as a legal concept, existed neither in antiquity nor during 
the Middle Ages.! It may well be that some international practice hardened 
into a customary law of neutrality in the 18th and 19th centuries, a 
development owing much to the theory and practice of the United States,2 
but the traditional legal edifice, structurally uncertain at the best of times, 
was badly shaken by the contrary usages of the 20th century's two world 
wars and nowadays, in terms of practice, the neutrality laws have sunk into 
a condition of "chronic obsolescence."3 In terms of theory, article 2(4) of 
the Charter of the United Nations makes war technically illegal,4 and, there 
being neither formal "belligerents" nor "neutrals," the "rights and duties 
of the old law of neutrality have terminated with the Charter."5 
What, then, to make of Chapter 7 of the new Commander's Handbook on 
the Law of Naval Operations: "The Law of Neutrality?"6 There are good 
English-language accounts of the traditional rules of the law of neutrality 
in the treatises ofOppenheim,7 Colombos,8 and O'Connell.9 A thoroughgoing 
account of the history of neutrality is to be found in Jessup's impressive four 
volumes. tO The Commander's Handbook means to give a brief rendition of the 
traditionallaw.ll How might it do better? Three ideas come to mind. 
First, the Commander's Handbook ought to acknowledge that modem 
international theory and practice rarely deal with "belligerents" and 
"neutrals" in their traditional senses. Virtually every paragraph of Chapter 
7 makes reference to "belligerents" and the introductory wording that "it 
has become increasingly difficult to determine with precision the point in 
time when hostilities have become a 'war' and to distinguish belligerent 
nations from those not participating in the conflict" only makes matters 
worse.!2 The point is that doctrine and practice no longer try to decide what 
is formally "war" and what is formally "peace." There are simply conflicts 
between nations which involve the use of force and/or economic sanctions. 
These conflicts usually entangle third states more or less uninterested in the 
outcome, but hopeful of remaining on friendly terms with both sides in the 
dispute. These third states are what we still call "neutrals," but they are no 
longer "neutrals" in the context of the traditional rules. 
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Second, Chapter 7 ought to abandon its more or less unskeptical treatment 
of the traditional law of neutrality. Its approach seems to be grounded on 
the commentary of observers like O'Connell and Baxter who have argued 
that, in theory at least, the old law of neutrality may still come into play 
if the United Nations fails to act at a time of armed conflict.13 But this is 
a .minority point-of-view. Most commentators agree that the technical 
abolition of "war" has also technically abolished the old laws of neutrality. 
Quincy Wright, for example, refutes Baxter simply and plainly: [NJeutrality 
in principle cannot exist. "14 Kussbach writes: "It seems clear that the rules 
of international law concerning neutral trading are applicable only when the 
state of neutrality itself is called into being, i.e., when a state of war exists. "15 
Moreover, whatever the outcome of the doctrinal debate about the legal 
effect of the U.N. Charter, even the most energetic proponents of the 
traditional elaboration must admit that there is little in modern practice to 
substantiate their theoretical preference. O'Connell himself observes 
respecting blockade (a topic which, along with its related rules respecting 
contraband and visit and search, absorbs most of Chapter 7'5 attention): 
"There has been practically no experience of blockade since 1945 to test the 
matter. "16 More realistically, Admiral Miller, dating the demise of traditional 
blockades to the uniform practice of the two world wars, has argued that 
it makes little sense to cling in theory to out-moded rules when "a new look 
is required at the legal framework by which the community seeks to regulate 
the conflict. "17 And McNulty makes good sense, not only about the rules of 
blockade specifically but about the laws of neutrality in general, when he 
writes about the legal and practical climate after 1945: 
In point of fact, it seems ludicrous to contemplate the possibility of any meaningful 
observance of the "legal" code of blockade in the current or predictable state of political 
reality. It is clear that the rules of blockade came into existence solely to protect the 
ordinary sea commerce of neutrals and to regulate the circumstances under which such 
trade could be interrupted. The rules derive out of a 19th century legal regime-a regime 
oriented toward regulating the conduct of states in war and peace. But modern 
international law, of which blockade is a part, no longer seeks to regulate war but to 
prevent its occurrence.l8 
Looking to recent events, Lauterpacht sees little modern practice of a 
traditional neutral-belligerent sort. In the Vietnam and Yemen conflicts, for 
example, there was no attempt "to require states not immediately involved 
to adopt positions of 'neutrality'. "19 And Norton, in a very helpful 1976 
survey,ZO concludes that "[rJecent armed conflicts have provided little cause 
to invoke the maritime rights and duties of the law of neutrality. "21 Looking 
at the United Nations naval blockade of North Korea in the Korean War 
and the Kuomintang blockade of the Communist Chinese, he decides the first 
"was only of marginal significance" because the North Korean supply routes 
were overland,22 while the second was futile because the naval powers rejected 
it for being ineffective.23 Norton does find three examples of visit and search: 
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Egypt's contraband system through the Suez Canal in the 1948 and 1956 Arab-
Israeli wars, India's and Pakistan's contraband lists in their 1965 conflict, and 
France's searches of merchant ships in the Algerian War of Independence.24 
But he concludes that all three visit and search cases are "anomalous" since 
in France's case, "the rights were improperly invoked" and in the other two 
cases "the belligerents relying upon these rights had virtually no navies and 
therefore could only apply them to neutral vessels coming within the 
belligerents' own waters."25 
In the Iran-Iraq war there has been a case made that traditional neutral 
rights and duties are still at stake. Shortly after the war began in September 
1980, both Iran and Iraq declared war or "exclusion" zones.26 Iraq's only major 
oil port was destroyed early in the fighting and it developed over-land pipeline 
routes, but Iran continued to rely on shipping oil. Beginning in 1984, Iraq 
began to strike at Iranian shipping and Iran at third country shipping, 
especially shipping ofIraq's friendly neighbors; altogether between 1984 and 
1987, Iraq attacked 234 ships and Iran 163 ships.27 Iran has also visited and 
searched a large number of ships in the Gulf.28 Beginning in 1987, Iran mined 
shipping lanes in the Gulf.29 Employing traditional law of neutrality concepts, 
it has been argued that: 
[T]he Persian Gulf belligerents, particularly Iran, have systematically violated the 
rights of neutral shipping. Nonbelligerent merchant vessels that are engaged in neutral 
commerce may not be attacked indiscriminately, as Iran has been doing.30 
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that whether such shipping is 
"neutral" or not depends on how you decide the question of whether a 
country, such as Kuwait, whose vessels are attacked, is truly a non-belligerent 
when the country is a direct financial supporter of Iraq.31 Furthermore, 
looking to the United Nations Charter and to the protection of reflagged 
Kuwaiti tankers by the United States, Professor Henkin has argued: 
In the Gulf, some spokesman said recently, the United States remains formally neutral. 
But even if the concept of neutrality can still apply in some cases, can the United States 
be neutral here? No one would accuse us of being a friend of Iran, but there is a strong 
case that Iraq is probably the aggressor. No one has mentioned that for some years now. 
It is true that the Security Council refrained from so holding, in part because the United 
States would not have permit [sic] it, or because the Russians would not permitted [sic] 
it. That raises some questions, but that doesn't change the law. In the absence of a 
Security Council determination that one party was the aggressor, do the laws of the 
Charter not apply? In the absence of such a finding by the Security Council, are states 
free to be neutral even if it is clear that one side had launched the war in violation 
of the Charter? ... 
Is Kuwait neutral, or is it, as the first speaker suggested, perhaps a co-belligerent? 
Is the United States supporting Kuwait, and, if so, are we also co-belligerents? If so, 
we may be not only supporting the aggressor-but if the old laws of war apply-we 
also may be violating the laws of war. 
I suggest we may not only have slipped into the war but, from the international 
lawyer's point of view, we seem to have slipped into a particular position on international 
law without much thought about it and without any thought to the long-term 
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consequences. In fact, we seem to be taking seriously the outdated laws of war, but 
not the contemporary law against war. In the process we may have eroded both. At 
least, it cannot be said that the law on neutrality and belligerency is what it was before 
1945.32 
This is not to say that rules about neutrals might no longer be useful, only 
that a rendition of the traditional rules, whether they be read in full in 
Oppenheim or Colomb os or in brief in the Commander's Handbook, no longer 
either describes practice or easily comports with theory. I agree that the object 
of the neutrality exercise should remain much what Chapter 7 says it ought 
to be: "to localize war, to limit the conduct of war on both land and sea, 
and to lessen the impact of war on international commerce."33 But a faithful 
account of antique rules is simply not a realistic way to proceed. 
Take, for example, the 1962 United States quarantine of strategic arms to 
Cuba. As Miller points out, "the United States could have declared war on 
Cuba, established a blockade, or announced lists of contraband items; although 
undoubtedly, many would have cried that the declaration of war, itself, was 
violative of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter."34 Rather, because "traditional 
'blockade' implies and requires a state of belligerency or war, the United 
States did not seek to justify the quarantine as a blockade. There was no 
assertion of a state of war or belligerency. "35 Instead, the United States 
fashioned the quarantine as a regional security action under the Rio Treaty 
and in accord with article 53 of the U.N. Charter.36 It might also have been 
justified as an exercise of a country's right of self-defense pursuant to Charter 
article 51.37 In.any case, the quarantine fell short of full-scale armed conflict. 
Indeed, the interference was intended to help establish a level of international 
conflict well below that of traditional legal "war" or the "war" more or 
less technically abolished by the United Nations' Charter. 
If my second proposition is right, that given the doctrinal quandaries and 
practical problems besetting the "shadowy existence" of the law of 
neutrality,38 the Commander's Handbook does not give that subject that "certain 
measure of scepticism" which most observers feel it dese.rves,39 what is to 
be done? Booth has suggested that since "[w]ar is rarely declared ... it is 
incumbent upon military organizations ... to make officers conversant with 
the background to the general rules oflaw governing military operations short 
of war."40 My third proposition is that Chapter 7 ought to explain that 
whatever we do have for rules respecting neutrality, even when they are 
invoked, they fall short of being the same sort of international law that is 
described in some other parts of the Commander's Handbook. Looking, for 
example, at the law about "Legal Divisions of the Oceans and Airspace, "41 
"International Status and Navigation of Warships and Military Aircraft,"42 
and "Protection of Persons and Property at Sea, "43 one sees, in my opinion, 
a much "harder" law than one observes reviewing the law of neutrality. It 
is, I think, unrealistic to assume that all international law is of the same 
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certainty or of the same legally binding effect. To do so casts unwarranted 
shadows of uncertainty and ineffectiveness on the more successful forms of 
the law of nations. 
It was John Austin, the English legal positivist, who wrote in 1832: 
[T]hat the law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive law 
is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its 
author .... [T]he law obtaining between nations is law (improperly so called) set by 
general opinion. The duties which it imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear 
on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, 
and incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally received 
and respected.44 
As early as 1836, international lawyers were having to cope with Austin's 
critique of their discipline as being merely a form of morality.45 And, although 
some are satisfied as to the law-like quality of international law, others are 
doubtful. H.L.A. Hart, for example, in a modem reformulation of legal 
positivism, argues that international law is more like primitive law than like 
municipal law because international law lacks "the formal structure of ... a 
legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction and officially organized 
• "46 sanctlOns .... 
However, neither Austin's nor Hart's nor most other general 
jurisprudential characterizations of international law pay particular attention 
to the diversity of international law. That is, most discussions of the problems 
of the certainty and efficacy of international law assume that there is a system, 
uncertain and ineffective though it may be, of international law and suppose 
that there is something like a single general integrated, if not hierarchial, 
international legal process. Reality is otherwise. 
Various forms of international law vary along what might be called a 
"structural spectrum," there being "a great variety of international legal 
systems, some more structured than others. "47 In some of its forms, for 
example, the system regulating nuclear weapons, international law may be 
so unstructured in terms of both rule-specificity and rule-enforcement as to 
be, at best, a sort of Hart's so-called "primitive law."48 In some other of its 
emanations, for example, the systems pertaining to the European Economic 
Community 'and to European Human Rights Law, international law may be 
so well-structured in terms of rule-specificity and rule-enforcement as to be 
virtually as "hard" as any ordinary domestic law.49 
Given the diversity of international legal systems, we should assume that 
there will be differences in the certainty of their rules and the efficacy of 
their enforcement processes. In analyzing the relationships between law and 
society, Max Weber, at the tum of the century, defined "law" as "an order 
system endowed with certain specific guaranties of the probability of its 
empirical validity."so Weber's necessary "guarantees" for law are more 
sophisticated than Austin's necessary "sovereigns" for law. Weber wrote of 
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a "coercive apparatus, i.e., that there are one or more persons whose special 
task it is to hold themselves ready to apply specially provided means of 
coercion (legal coercion) for the purpose of norm enforcement." The coercive 
apparatus" may use psychological as well as physical means of coercion and 
may operate directly or indirectly against the participants in the system.51 
Weber's conceptual framework is, I submit, a more useful and realistic way 
to understand the nature and diversity of international law than the theories 
provided by Austin and Hart. 
Looking back to neutrality, it is helpful to remember that "the rules of 
neutrality are products of two forces pulling in opposite directions, the final 
result being determined by the relative bargaining power of the parties. "52 
This is not a promising circumstance, either for the elaboration of certain 
rules or for the efficacious enforcement of those rules. Indeed, in great wars, 
whether they be the Napoleonic Wars or the World Wars, the legal system 
of neutrality has been apt to collapse altogether.53 
It may be that there will be periods of time, such as that between 1815 
and 1914, when, because of the conditions of international politics, there will 
be a sufficient consensus to generate generally accepted rules and a coercive 
apparatus for a law of neutrality.54 Moreover, even in times of uncertainty 
and inefficacy, there may be occasional authorities which will pronounce an 
illegality under the law of neutrality. 55 However, for the most part, the rules 
respecting "neutrality" or what Fenwick preferred to call "non-
participation"56 will be rules tailor-made to fit particular conflicts and will 
neither be norms of general specificity nor will they be enforced by a coercive 
apparatus comparable to that available for "harder" forms of international 
law. 
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